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The House bill that led to the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-97)1 would have repealed 
section 117(d) of the code, dealing with the tax 
treatment of tuition waivers provided by 
educational institutions to their employees and 
some family members of the employees.2 The 
proposed repeal generated hysteria on university 
campuses and in the press, but as was true with 
many other provisions in the House bill (like the 
proposed repeal of section 127, another education-
related section3), the repeal of section 117(d) didn’t 
happen.4 Nevertheless, on the theory that section 
117(d) may come under attack again (and section 
127, too), it’s important to understand what a 
repeal would — and wouldn’t — have done.
In this report I explain why I think much of the 
commentary on the proposed repeal was 
overwrought5 and some of it was just wrong. 
That’s not to say that section 117(d) deserved to 
expire; it’s only to say that commentators, 
including university administrators, should have 
focused on what really would have happened in a 
world without section 117(d).
Most of the news stories and pronouncements 
of university administrators characterized the 
proposed repeal as an attack on graduate 
education in that it would have made taxable (or 
so it was argued) tuition waivers provided to 
graduate students who serve as teaching or 
research assistants.6 (From now on I’m going to 
use “TAs” as an umbrella term to refer to both 
Erik M. Jensen is the 
Coleman P. Burke 
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In this report, Jensen 
argues that much of the 
resistance to the 
proposed repeal of 
section 117(d) was 
misguided because the 
effects on graduate 
students would have 
been far more limited 
than claimed, and the real impact of repeal 
would have been on the tax treatment of 
undergraduate tuition waivers.
1
Or whatever we’re supposed to call the legislation after the 
reconciliation process. The official, ungainly title is “An Act to Provide 
for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent 
Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018,” P.L. 115-97, signed by the 
president on December 22, 2017.
2
H.R. 1, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., section 1204(a)(3).
3
See H.R. 1, section 1204(a)(2). Section 127 provides an exclusion of up 
to $5,250 for amounts paid or incurred by an employer in providing 
educational assistance to an employee if specified requirements are met. 
(That $5,250 figure isn’t indexed for inflation and has been on the books 
for years.)
4
The Senate bill contained no provision to repeal either section 117(d) 
or section 127 (see S. Amdt. 1855, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017)), and 
neither repeal survived conference committee deliberations.
5
Not all the commentary, of course. See, e.g., Patrick W. Thomas, 
“GOP Raises Taxes on Graduate Students . . . Or Does It?” Surly 
Subgroup Blog, Nov. 6, 2017.
6
See, e.g., Eric Kelderman, “How the Republican Tax Plan Could Hurt 
Graduate Students and American Research,” The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, Nov. 17, 2017, at A19 (quoting several graduate students and 
faculty as if a repeal of section 117(d) would have horrible effects on 
graduate education and would affect no one else); and Kelderman, “How 
the House GOP Tax Plan Would Affect Grad Students,” The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, Dec. 1, 2017, at A22 (noting the effect of repeal on some 
undergraduate tuition waivers — i.e., for those students who are resident 
assistants — but focusing on graduate students).
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teaching and research assistants.) That’s very 
misleading.
Section 117(d) makes it possible, in some 
circumstances, for an employee of an educational 
institution to exclude from gross income the 
amount of a tuition reduction provided to the 
employee, the employee’s spouse, or a dependent 
child of the employee. In fact, the purportedly 
“general” rule of section 117(d)(1) is that “gross 
income shall not include any qualified tuition 
reduction.” But not all tuition reductions are 
qualified. For one thing, the exclusion can apply, 
in general, only to tuition reductions for 
education “below the graduate level.”7 By its 
terms, section 117(d) at first glance therefore 
seems to have no application at all to graduate 
students. But section 117(d)(5) provides a special 
rule for graduate students who are TAs and are 
getting tuition waivers: “In the case of the 
education of an individual who is a graduate 
student at [a qualifying educational institution] 
and who is engaged in teaching or research 
activities for such organization, paragraph (2) 
shall be applied as if it did not contain the phrase 
‘(below the graduate level)’” (emphasis added).
If section 117(d) had been repealed, section 
117(d)(5) would obviously have gone down with 
the ship. For reasons I don’t understand, it was 
doing away with that special treatment of TAs 
that generated most of the controversy about 
section 117(d)’s possible repeal. The idea that 
repealing section 117(d) would have unfortunate 
consequences for graduate education, and only 
graduate education, both overstated the 
significance of section 117(d)(5) and understated 
the significance of section 117(d) as a whole, 
which is in no way an expansive exclusion for 
graduate-level tuition waivers.
I don’t blame the graduate students who 
organized to fight the repeal of section 117(d), 
successfully as it turned out (at least for now). 
They were told that this proposed change 
targeted them, and they had no reason to think 
otherwise. (Few graduate students are tax 
professionals or tax-professionals-to-be, after all, 
and many of the educational institutions didn’t 
help the grad students with statutory 
interpretation.)8 And under the circumstances, 
the grad students had reason to be scared about 
the possible economic effects of a repeal. TAs were 
led to believe that if their tuition waiver is 
nominally $50,000, say, they would be taxed on 
$50,000 if section 117(d)(5) disappeared — a 
frightening thought for those subsisting on ramen 
noodles. (If the TAs are employees of the 
university, as they presumably are, section 127 
might have provided for a limited exclusion of up 
to $5,250 per year for educational assistance, 
assuming the requirements of that section are 
satisfied.9 That would have helped the TAs a bit, 
but no more than that. In any event, the House bill 
would have repealed section 127 as well as section 
117(d).10)
The repeal of section 117(d) might not have 
made any sense to begin with — I’m not sure 
where the proposal came from11 — but I argue that 
the reasons given in most of the commentary for 
resisting repeal were often suspect. (We saw a lot 
of — dare I say it? — fake news.) And the reasons 
against repeal that should have been mustered 
often weren’t. Most important, as I discuss in 
Section I, is that doing away with section 117(d) 
would have affected tuition waivers that have no 
connection whatsoever to graduate education. 
Section II analyzes the effects of a section 117(d) 
7
Section 117(d)(2).
8
The applicable standard should be, “When in doubt, look at the 
statute.” And that’s a good idea even if you’re not in doubt.
9
See supra note 3. Among the requirements is that there be a 
“separate written plan of an employer for the exclusive benefits of his 
employees to provide such employees with educational assistance.” 
Section 127(b)(1). If a university doesn’t have such a document, it could 
easily create one. And the plan can’t discriminate in favor of highly 
compensated employees (section 127(b)(2)), but a plan directed at TAs 
surely would satisfy the nondiscrimination requirement. Discussions 
about section 127 generally assume that an educational assistance plan is 
one in which an employer pays to send employees to educational 
institutions, which of course is the case for most employers that aren’t 
educational institutions themselves. But an “employer’s provision of 
education to an employee” can be part of an educational assistance 
program. See reg. section 1.127-2(c)(1)(ii); and infra notes 57-58 and 
accompanying text.
10
See supra note 3.
11
It’s been suggested that the proposed repeal was part of a partisan 
attack on higher education, and there may be something to that. But I 
suspect most members of Congress were, like the graduate students, 
clueless about all this. The House and Senate bills were massive 
documents, and the repeals of sections 117(d) and 127 were hardly 
focuses of the House bill.
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repeal on graduate students in five different 
situations, concluding that the effects in many if 
not most circumstances would have been — or 
should have been, if I’m right12 — much more 
limited than opponents of repeal claimed. Finally, 
Section III considers what the measure of income 
should be if a tuition reduction is taxable, and it 
questions the common assumption that the stated 
tuition figure — the sticker price — should be 
given controlling weight in valuing an 
educational benefit.
I. Effect of Repeal on Undergraduates
As I’ve noted, most of the controversy about 
the repeal of section 117(d) focused on graduate 
students, but eliminating section 117(d) would 
have harmed undergraduate tuition waivers as 
well (and, for that matter, tuition waivers 
provided at private elementary and secondary 
schools to dependents of faculty and staff13).
The universities that focused their resistance 
to the repeal of section 117(d) on the assumed 
effects on graduate students ignored a more 
politically powerful argument: the detrimental 
effects the change would have had on many staff 
and on the educational institutions themselves if 
undergraduate tuition waivers became taxable.
Folks like secretaries, cafeteria workers, and 
janitors at a college or university who may have 
taken their relatively low-paying jobs precisely 
because of the tuition waiver program — making 
it economically possible, they thought, to send 
their kids to college14 — would have lost a major 
nontaxable fringe benefit if section 117(d) had 
been repealed.15 Indeed, the repeal might have 
made college for many employees’ kids an 
impossible dream.16 As an official of the American 
Council on Education put it — an organization 
that recognized that the effects of repealing 
section 117(d) would have gone far beyond 
graduate students — “The janitors are collateral 
damage.”17
If the university where you work has a stated 
undergraduate tuition of $50,000 and that tuition 
is waived when your child attends the university 
(with no expectation that the kid perform services 
for the school), under section 117(d)(1), that 
benefit wouldn’t be taxed to you. Do away with 
section 117(d), however, and you would suddenly 
have a bump up in taxable income of as much as 
$50,000 (if that’s the appropriate measure of 
income18). (For reasons I discuss later, that benefit 
almost certainly couldn’t be treated as a tax-free 
scholarship, and, with a couple of very limited 
exceptions, it’s hard to imagine any other 
justification for excluding the value of the benefit 
from the gross income of the university 
employee.)
To a low-income college employee, that result 
could be catastrophic. In those circumstances, as a 
last resort it might make more economic sense to 
send the kid to Big State University and pay full 
tuition (or borrow to pay full tuition) rather than 
have him or her attend the employee’s home 
institution and receive a sizeable taxable tuition 
benefit. (And maybe the kid can get a tuition 
reduction at Big State — or some other institution 
for which no one in the family works — that can 
be treated as a good old-fashioned nontaxable 
12
It happens occasionally.
13
To simplify the discussion, after this I’m going to ignore the effect 
of a 117(d) repeal on employees of private elementary and secondary 
schools, but it would have been real.
14
Even with section 117(d), the exclusion for qualified tuition 
reductions doesn’t help all university employees with kids. For there to 
be a benefit to a particular employee, the kids must be willing to go to 
school at that university (or to another school for which the employer 
school provides educational benefits). See infra note 16. Also, the kids 
must meet the requirements for admission. If they can’t get in, there’s 
obviously no tuition reduction. Finally, if the kids can get scholarships 
from other universities, section 117(a) should make those scholarships 
nontaxable, in which case the repeal of section 117(d) wouldn’t matter 
nearly as much.
15
The college might continue to have a tuition waiver program, of 
course, but the program’s tax-free status would have disappeared.
16
For purposes of this report, I’m generally ignoring tuition benefits 
provided for employees to send their kids to other schools, but the 
possibility of an excludable tuition waiver being partly or wholly tax-
free exists in that situation as well. See section 117(d)(2) (exclusion can 
apply to “any reduction in tuition provided to an employee of an 
organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education 
(below the graduate level) at such organization (or another organization 
described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii)” of the employee or another person 
described in section 132(h) (emphasis added)). The affected educational 
institutions include any “organization which normally maintains a 
regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled 
body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its 
educational activities are regularly carried on.” Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
(Somebody should write an article on why Congress thought it 
necessary to list “pupils” and “students” separately in that last passage.)
17
Quoted in Melissa Korn, “Universities, Companies Fight to Keep 
Tax-Free Tuition Assistance,” The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 11, 2017. That 
news story was one of the unusual ones in which it was noted that the 
repeal of section 117(d) wouldn’t have affected only graduate TAs, and it 
discussed the possible repeal of section 127, also included in the House 
bill. See supra note 3.
18
Which it shouldn’t be. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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scholarship,19 a benefit that would be immune 
from the effects of a repeal of section 117(d).)
If employees of educational institutions can 
take advantage of undergraduate tuition waivers, 
they benefit economically with section 117(d) in 
the code, and so do the institutions. A tax-free 
undergraduate tuition benefit makes it possible to 
recruit at least some staff (and maybe faculty, too) 
at lower salaries than would otherwise be 
required. The additional undergraduate students 
attributable to a nontaxable tuition waiver 
program generally impose small costs on a school 
(assuming the students’ beer consumption 
doesn’t lead to destruction of school property),20 
even if those students generate little or no tuition 
revenue.
And it’s not as though repealing section 117(d) 
would have been a big revenue raiser for Treasury. 
One of the effects of taxing undergraduate tuition 
waivers would have been that university 
employees wouldn’t have taken advantage of 
those waivers nearly as much. Doing away with 
section 117(d) would have generated some tax 
revenue, to be sure, but it would have been a drop 
in the federal bucket.
II. Effects on Graduate Students
So the repeal of section 117(d) would probably 
have made undergraduate tuition waivers (those 
that aren’t scholarships) taxable, and that would 
have been a big deal by itself. But let’s get back to 
the graduate student situation. Section 117(d) 
generally doesn’t apply to tuition reductions at 
the graduate level, but section 117(d)(5) does 
provide for the possibility of a graduate-level 
tuition waiver being tax-free, at least in part, for 
TAs.
A. Graduate Tuition Reductions: Five Situations
What would be the tax treatment of graduate-
level tuition reductions if there were no section 
117(d)? I examine five situations involving 
graduate students who get tuition breaks. (You 
almost certainly can come up with variations that 
are worth discussion, but I think I’m covering the 
most important possibilities.)
1. The graduate student has had no prior 
employment relationship with the 
university and will not work for the 
university as a TA (or anything else) 
during the time as a graduate student. Nor 
does anyone else in the student’s family 
have such an employment relationship 
(that is, the student’s not getting a tuition 
reduction because Mom, Dad, or a spouse 
works for the university). The student 
simply receives a tuition reduction for 
graduate study.
2. The same as case 1, except that the tuition 
reduction is conditioned on the student’s 
serving as a TA.
3. The graduate student’s tuition is reduced 
because Mom, Dad, or the student’s 
spouse works for the university, and the 
student isn’t a TA.
4. The graduate student’s tuition is reduced, 
not because a family member works for 
the educational institution, but because 
and only because the student is a TA — an 
employee of the university herself.
5. The graduate student’s tuition is reduced 
because Mom, Dad, or the student’s 
spouse works for the university, but the 
student also serves as a TA. The tuition 
reduction is conditioned on the student’s 
being a TA.
I consider these possibilities one by one.
1. The plain old scholarship.
If a graduate student in a degree program is 
paying less than the full sticker price (as is true for 
almost all graduate students in the United States 
who aren’t in professional programs and, for that 
matter, for quite a few professional students as 
well21), the student isn’t working for the university 
as a TA or otherwise, and the student’s family 19
See section 117(a); and infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
20
At least that’s true if the students are occupying seats in the 
classroom that would otherwise have been unoccupied. Of course, even 
if that’s so, an additional student isn’t completely cost-free. There are all 
those individual meetings with students, exam grading, and paper 
reading that faculty must do. On the other hand, the faculty aren’t likely 
to be paid more because of those additional students, and the 
administrative costs associated with a few additional students shouldn’t 
be large.
21
That’s true for law students for sure and for many MBA students as 
well. See Kelsey Gee, “Hey, Bargain-Hunters: An M.B.A. Is Cheaper Than 
You Think,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 3, 2018 (noting that for the 
Harvard Business School’s class of 2019, the average annual tuition paid 
is $35,000, when the sticker price is $72,000).
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members are also not employed by the university, 
there should generally be no gross income 
associated with a tuition “reduction.”22
That tuition reduction looks and quacks like a 
scholarship, the tax treatment of which should be 
governed by section 117(a). That section excludes 
a qualified scholarship from gross income to the 
extent it covers “qualified tuition and related 
expenses.”23 (If that’s the case, any valuation issues 
go away. Whatever the value of the nontaxable 
benefit, it’s excludable from gross income.) To be a 
qualified scholarship, the tuition reduction can’t 
be compensation for a family member’s 
performing services for the university,24 and the 
student must be in a degree program.
Assuming those requirements are satisfied, 
the scholarship is tax-free. And the basic 
scholarship rules of section 117(a) don’t 
distinguish between undergraduate and graduate 
scholarships. In either case, they’re tax-free up to 
the level of qualified tuition and related expenses.
The special rules in section 117(d) are 
therefore irrelevant if the student is getting a 
straightforward scholarship, and the repeal of 
section 117(d) would have had no effect on 
graduate students in those circumstances.
2. ‘Qualified scholarship’ but services 
required.
Although section 117(a) generally excludes 
from a student’s gross income any qualified 
scholarship, up to the level of qualified tuition 
and related expenses, the exclusion may not apply 
in full if a student is performing services as a 
condition of receiving the scholarship. As is true 
with a qualified tuition reduction under section 
117(d), to the extent the tuition reduction from the 
scholarship is “payment for teaching, research, or 
other services by the student required as a 
condition for receiving the . . . qualified tuition 
reduction,”25 the exclusion wouldn’t apply. As a 
result, all or part of a tuition reduction called a 
scholarship could be taxable compensation for 
services.26 But the part of an otherwise legitimate 
scholarship that doesn’t compensate for services 
remains tax-free for graduate students and 
undergraduate students.
The repeal of section 117(d) wouldn’t have 
changed any of this.
3. Tuition reduction because of family 
member’s employment, no TA arrangement.
Now, if the student gets the graduate tuition 
reduction because Mom or Dad (or spouse) is an 
employee of the university, the student almost 
certainly wouldn’t be treated as receiving a 
scholarship. A scholarship is in the nature of a 
gift, with no expectation of benefit in return,27 and 
in this scenario, the tuition benefit is part of the 
compensation package for the employee (not the 
student). There’s a quid for the quo. The exclusion 
of section 117(d)(1) for a qualified tuition 
reduction also couldn’t apply because the waiver 
is at the graduate level and has nothing to do with 
the student’s being a TA, thus making section 
117(d)(5) irrelevant.
On these facts, once again the repeal of section 
117(d) wouldn’t have mattered. The benefit would 
almost certainly have been taxable regardless of 
whether section 117(d) is in effect. It’s not the 
graduate student who would be taxed on the 
22
I put “reduction” in quotation marks just because it doesn’t seem to 
be much of a reduction if most other graduate students at the institution 
are paying little or nothing. I’ll come back to that point in discussing 
what the amount of income to be taxed should be if the affected student 
(or the associated family member) isn’t able to exclude the value of the 
tuition benefit. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
23
Qualified tuition and related expenses generally includes tuition 
and fees and the cost of “books, supplies, and equipment for courses of 
instruction” at the educational institution. Section 117(b)(2). If the 
financial aid covers more than qualified tuition and related expenses — 
meals and lodging perhaps — the excess amount wouldn’t be tax-free 
under section 117(a).
24
If the tuition reduction is compensation for a family member — i.e., 
a quid quo pro is involved — the tuition reduction is unlikely to be 
treated as a scholarship. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. In that 
case, we’d have to look at section 117(d). (Could a tuition reduction to 
the dependent child of a university employee ever be a scholarship? 
Maybe, if the student is selected to receive the scholarship by a 
disinterested group that is unaware of the employment relationship with 
the university. But that’s not the norm.)
25
With exceptions, “subsections (a) [dealing with qualified 
scholarships] and (d) [dealing with qualified tuition reductions] shall not 
apply to that portion of any amount received which represents payment 
for teaching or other services by the student required as a condition for 
receiving the qualified scholarship or qualified tuition reduction.” 
Section 117(c)(1). For these purposes, the term “payment” should be 
interpreted expansively. All or part of a reduction in tuition could be 
treated as a payment.
26
If a scholarship student performing services is treated as an 
employee of the university, section 127 might exclude up to $5,250 of 
otherwise taxable income, assuming the requirements of that section are 
satisfied. See supra note 9.
27
See reg. section 1.117-4(c); see also Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 
(1969). It’s been noted that proposed regulations issued in 1988 under 
section 117 are a bit more generous in characterizing what can be a 
qualified scholarship. Prop. reg. section 1.117-6. But I see no reason to 
give authoritative weight to 20-year-old proposals that were never 
finalized and that — as far as I know — no one is working on anymore.
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benefit, but the family member employed by the 
university (unless you can come up with some 
other theory for exclusion — a probably 
impossible task).28
4. Tuition reduction not caused by family 
member’s employment but conditioned on 
student’s being a TA.
Next, what if the graduate student receives a 
tuition reduction not because of any family 
member’s employment with the university, but 
because the student is serving as a TA? In that 
case, section 117(d)(5) might apply, making it 
possible for the tuition reduction at the graduate 
level to be treated as a qualified tuition reduction. 
Or the tuition reduction might be considered a 
qualified scholarship, despite the student’s also 
having an employment relationship with the 
university.29
But either way, the exclusion wouldn’t apply 
to the extent the waiver is compensation for 
services.30 This is an important point that was 
overlooked in much of the discussion about the 
possible repeal of section 117(d). It has never been 
the case that the full amount of a qualified tuition 
reduction is necessarily tax-free. To the extent the 
student benefiting from the reduction is receiving 
“payment for teaching, research, or other services 
by the student required as a condition for 
receiving the . . . qualified tuition reduction,”31 the 
exclusion from gross income doesn’t apply. So, 
regardless of the special treatment of TAs in 
section 117(d)(5), the student might be taxed on 
the value of the benefits provided to compensate 
the student for services, assuming no other 
authority for excluding the benefit exists, and that 
value could include all or part of the reduced 
tuition.32
So, even with section 117(d) in force, an 
exclusion of the full value of a tuition reduction 
attributable to a graduate student’s being a TA 
wouldn’t result from that section. And obviously 
the possible partial exclusion attributable to the 
interplay between section 117(d)(1) and section 
117(d)(5) would be gone if 117(d) as a whole had 
been repealed.
That might sound ominous, but it simply 
means that, with or without section 117(d), we 
should look for alternative theories for exclusion. 
And the TA would be an employee, wouldn’t she? 
If so, section 127 would likely apply (unless it was 
repealed, as was also provided for in the House 
bill), exempting up to $5,250 of income associated 
with an educational assistance program provided 
by employers to employees from an employee’s 
gross income, assuming that the employer has a 
qualifying program in place.33
Even more important, however, the benefit 
seems to be a working condition fringe, as defined 
in section 132(d), excludable from an employee’s 
income under section 132(a)(3). A working 
condition fringe is generally a benefit provided by 
an employer to an employee that if it had been 
paid for by the employee would have been 
deductible to that employee under either section 
162, the ordinary and necessary business expense 
provision, or section 167, dealing with allowances 
for depreciation.
If the student is also an employee, as a TA 
would be, and the student-employee paid tuition 
for further training in the field in which she is a 
TA, wouldn’t she satisfy the requirements of 
section 162, as set out in reg. section 1.162-5? For 
an employee to be able to treat educational 
expenditures as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses, the regulation generally requires that 
the expenditures maintain or improve skills 
28
Section 127 doesn’t apply if someone other than the employee is the 
beneficiary of the educational assistance program. The benefit isn’t a 
working condition fringe as defined in section 132(d) to the employee 
because if the employee paid for a child’s education, the expenditure 
wouldn’t be deductible to the employee under section 162. And even 
though that might seem like a no-additional-cost service as defined in 
section 132(b) if the student isn’t bumping an otherwise full-paying 
customer, there is reason to think that because of section 132(l), an 
educational benefit can’t be treated as a tax-free no-additional-cost 
service under section 132. Similarly, section 132(l) probably precludes 
treating 20 percent of the value of the services as an excludable qualified 
employee discount as defined in section 132(c). See infra notes 44-47 and 
accompanying text.
29
Because of section 117(c)(1), both section 117(a) and (d) must be 
premised on the assumption that at least part of a tuition reduction can 
be tax-free even if the student is also performing services for the 
institution — that is, even if the student may be treated as an employee 
for some purposes. Reg. section 1.117-4(c) therefore shouldn’t require 
treating the entire reduction as taxable just because of the employment 
relationship. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30
Section 117(c)(1); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31
Section 117(c)(1). That same rule applies in determining the tax 
effect of a qualified scholarship. Id.
32
But even so, the measure of any income should be the value of the 
benefit, not the amount of the reduction below the sticker price for 
tuition. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
33
See supra note 9. Repeal of section 127 was also part of the House 
bill, see supra note 3, but that section, like section 117(d), survived the 
legislative process.
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required in the employee’s employment,34 not be a 
minimum educational requirement “for 
qualification in his employment,”35 and not 
qualify the person for a new trade or business.36
Most TAs, at least those in nonprofessional 
programs, should meet those requirements. If 
you’re a TA in physics doing work toward a 
master’s or a PhD in physics and you’re paying for 
the education that will improve or maintain your 
skills in physics, you’d be able to characterize the 
tuition as an ordinary and necessary business 
expense.37 You’re doing physics already, and 
you’re studying for an advanced degree in 
physics. That study will improve your skills as a 
physicist, and it’s not necessary for a physicist to 
have an advanced degree to be employed as a 
physicist — that is, the degree wouldn’t be a 
minimum educational requirement for the 
business or qualify you for a new trade or 
business. Yes, a PhD might open up some 
academic (and other) positions that would 
otherwise be closed to you, but there’s no 
generally applicable requirement that one have a 
PhD to do physics in an educational (or any other) 
setting.38 What will you be doing if you later 
become an assistant professor of physics 
somewhere? Teaching and research, just what 
you’re doing now, but with your skills enhanced 
by the graduate education received while an 
employee of the university.
Now it may be that because of other 
limitations on deductibility, the student-employee 
would in fact be unable to deduct the full sticker 
price for tuition if she had actually paid it herself. 
Employee business expenses are itemized 
deductions. Moreover, they’re miscellaneous 
itemized deductions — that is, they’re 
expenditures that meet the requirements of 
section 162 for potential deductibility but that 
have long been subject to stringent limitations on 
deductibility.39 And as a result of the TCJA, for tax 
years from 2018 through 2025, miscellaneous 
itemized deductions aren’t deductible at all under 
the regular income tax40 (as has been the case 
under the alternative minimum tax anyway41). But 
limitations of that sort aren’t considered in 
determining whether a benefit is a working 
condition fringe.42 The only question is whether 
the threshold requirements for deductibility 
under section 162 (or section 167) would be 
satisfied if the employee had made the 
expenditure herself.43 If so, the benefit provided 
by the employer to the employee seems to be a 
working condition fringe.
Although I’d like to, I can’t ignore the cryptic 
section 132(l), which could throw a monkey 
34
Reg. section 1.162-5(a)(1). The regulation provides an alternative 
test: demonstrating that the education meets express requirements of the 
employer, or of applicable law, to retain an already existing position. See 
reg. section 1.162-5(a)(2).
35
Reg. section 1.162-5(b)(2)(i) and -5(a).
36
Reg. section 1.162-5(b)(3) and -5(a).
37
One might reasonably question whether all educational 
expenditures that meet the requirements of reg. section 1.162-5 are really 
expenses rather than capital expenditures. Many educational 
expenditures have significant future benefits (or so one hopes). And 
capital expenditures are generally not deductible, unless Congress 
provides specific authority to make them deductible. If we were starting 
from scratch in thinking about the deductibility of education 
expenditures, the expense-versus-capital-expenditure issue might be a 
reasonable one to raise. But it has long been taken for granted that 
expenditures that meet the stated requirements of the regulation are 
ordinary and necessary business expenses. For example, the costs of 
getting an LLM in taxation are generally deductible for someone who is 
already a tax lawyer, even though the expenditure will have effects on 
the rest of that lawyer’s professional career.
38
It might be necessary to have a PhD to get a faculty position as a 
physicist at many universities, but it’s not a requirement at all academic 
institutions. And it’s certainly not a requirement for positions in physics 
more generally. In contrast, a law degree does qualify a person for a new 
trade or business, or so the regulation suggests. See reg. section 1.162-
5(b)(3)(ii), Example 2. As a result, the cost of a JD program isn’t 
deductible, even if the reason for getting the degree is to improve skills 
in a non-lawyer position — being a law librarian, for example.
39
Until the TCJA, miscellaneous itemized deductions were 
deductible only to the extent that, in the aggregate, they exceeded 2 
percent of adjusted gross income (section 67, before amendment by the 
TCJA), and then only to the extent that the potentially deductible portion 
of the miscellaneous itemized deductions together with other itemized 
deductions exceeded the standard deduction for the taxpayer.
40
See TCJA section 11045 (adding subsection (f) to section 67).
41
See section 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
42
See reg. section 1.132-5(a)(1)(vi) (noting that “the limitation of 
section 67(a) (relating to the two-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized 
deductions) is not considered when determining the amount of a 
working condition fringe”); and supra note 39.
43
That’s how the working condition fringe rules had been understood 
under prior law, under which miscellaneous itemized deductions, 
including employee business expenses, were deductible only to the 
extent of amounts exceeding 2 percent of AGI. If that’s not the way the 
provision is interpreted now, the working condition fringe category 
would largely be gone, except for benefits that if paid for by the 
employee would have been deductible to the employee under section 
167, the depreciation provision. The reference in section 132(d) to section 
162 (“if the employee paid for such . . . services, such payment would be 
allowable as a deduction under section 162”) would be surplusage, at 
least if the regulations are correct in providing that the language doesn’t 
apply to a hypothetical payment that “would be allowable as a 
deduction with respect to a trade or business of an employee other than 
the employee’s trade or business of being an employee of the employer.” 
Reg. section 1.132-5(a)(2)(i). As we all know, Congress never includes 
surplus language in legislation.
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wrench into the above analysis. Except for de 
minimis fringes — a category that should be 
irrelevant for tuition reductions anyway — 
section 132(l) provides that section 132 “shall not 
apply to any fringe benefits of a type the tax 
treatment of which is expressly provided for in 
any other section of this chapter.” (Perhaps 
Congress could have come up with fuzzier 
language, but doing that would have required 
effort.) Educational benefits of the tuition 
reduction sort are expressly provided for in other 
provisions, including sections 117 and 127, and 
section 132(l) might mean that a tuition reduction 
provided by an educational institution to an 
employee — a fringe benefit to the employee — 
can’t be a working condition fringe.
My understanding is that one intention of 
section 132(l) was to prevent a tuition reduction 
provided to a university employee (or spouse or 
dependent child of an employee) from being 
treated as a no-additional-cost service (as defined 
in section 132(b)), excludable from the employee’s 
gross income under section 132(a)(1). If a 
university has empty seats in the program in 
which an employee is taking classes, the benefit 
might seem to be an excess-capacity service, like 
an airline employee’s occupying an otherwise 
empty seat on a flight or a hotel chain employee’s 
occupying an otherwise empty hotel room — the 
quintessential no-additional-cost service.44 But if 
section 132(l) controls — and it probably does 
under current law45 — an employee occupying 
otherwise empty seats in a university’s 
classrooms, and therefore perhaps imposing no 
substantial additional costs on the university, 
can’t exclude the benefit from gross income for 
that reason. (In many cases, however, particularly 
with graduate students, the costs to the university 
attributable to additional students receiving 
tuition reductions may be substantial, in which 
case the possibility of a no-additional-cost service 
would disappear anyway.)46
Similarly, because of section 132(l), a tuition 
reduction isn’t supposed to be treated as a 
qualified employee discount for services, 
therefore excludable from gross income under 
section 132(a)(2) to the extent the discount doesn’t 
exceed “20 percent of the price at which the 
services are being offered by the employer to 
customers.”47
Commentators have maintained that section 
132(l) might also preclude treating a tuition 
reduction as a working condition fringe, and there 
is some evidence in unpublished IRS rulings and 
advice (now dated, often unclear, and sometimes 
pointing in different directions) to support that 
position.48 But because of the requirement that 
there be a sufficient connection between the 
nature of the benefit and the employee’s trade or 
business as an employee — the requirement that 
either section 162 or section 167 would have 
applied if the employee had paid for the fringe 
benefit — the working condition fringe seems to 
be qualitatively different from qualified employee 
discounts and no-additional-cost services. It’s 
44
Those are two of the three examples of excess-capacity services 
given in reg. section 1.132-2(a)(2). The third is telephone services. 
Forgone revenue can be an additional cost for these purposes (see 
section 132(b)(2)), but if the employee is occupying what would 
otherwise have been an empty seat or hotel room, there’s no forgone 
revenue.
45
None of the examples in the relevant regulation involves anything 
like educational benefits. See supra note 44.
46
At least in some fields, graduate students cost the institution a lot 
— laboratory expenses, for example. And even in less capital-intensive 
fields, having an additional graduate student paying little or no tuition 
makes economic demands on the institution, particularly because of the 
generally close relationship between grad students and faculty mentors. 
It’s not the same as having an additional undergraduate sitting in a 
lecture hall with 300 other students.
47
Section 132(c)(1)(B).
48
See, e.g., LTR 9040045 (paraphrasing, but not precisely quoting, reg. 
section 1.132-1(f)(1) to the effect that “because section 117(d) provides 
for the tax treatment of tuition reductions, the exclusions under section 
132 generally do not apply to free or discounted tuition waivers provided 
by an educational institution to its employees, whether the tuition is for 
study at or below the graduate level” (emphasis added)). In that private 
letter ruling, the word “generally” was added to the regulatory 
language, and the ruling noted the possibility of graduate tuition 
benefits being treated as a working condition fringe so long as the tuition 
benefits “relate to the employee’s trade or business as an employee of the 
employer providing the benefits.” Twelve years later, in FSA 200231016, 
the IRS advised that a “tuition reduction provided by a university may 
not be excluded from an employee’s gross income as a working 
condition fringe benefit,” and it suggested that working condition fringe 
treatment is available only if the employer “pays” something, which is 
not the case with a qualified tuition reduction. Further, the 2002 field 
service advice suggested that the 1990 letter ruling was intended to 
conclude that working condition fringe treatment might be available 
only to the extent that (1) the employer pays something to another 
organization for an employee’s education and (2) either section 127 
wouldn’t apply at all, or the expenses exceed the $5,250 annual 
exclusion.
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hard to see why a tuition reduction that meets the 
definition of working condition fringe should 
automatically fail to qualify for the exclusion.
In any event, some educational benefits 
provided by employers to employees may well be 
working condition fringes. In 1989 Congress 
specifically provided, in what is now section 
132(j)(8), that “amounts paid or expenses incurred 
by the employer for education or training 
provided to the employee which are not 
excludable from gross income under section 127 
shall be excluded from gross income under this 
section if (and only if) such amounts or expenses 
are a working condition fringe.”49 At a minimum, 
that provision seems to approve the possibility of 
working condition fringe treatment in connection 
with “amounts paid or expenses incurred” by the 
employer under section 127 programs that exceed 
the $5,250 cap. Not all, or even most, benefits 
provided in a section 127 program will be 
working condition fringes, because there’s no 
requirement under that section that the education 
be in the same trade or business that the employee 
is currently working in. But if, for a particular 
employee, the educational assistance is 
sufficiently connected to the employee’s existing 
trade or business and the other requirements of 
reg. section 1.162-5 are satisfied, the benefit is a 
working condition fringe.
In its guidance to employers on the tax 
treatment of fringe benefits, the IRS assumes that 
an educational benefit can be a working condition 
fringe even if section 127 would apply in part. The 
agency has accepted the proposition that an 
educational benefit that is not excludable under 
section 127, or that exceeds the dollar limitation in 
that section, may still be a working condition 
fringe.50 Indeed, the IRS states straightforwardly 
that “property or a service provided is a working 
condition benefit to the extent that if the employee 
paid for it, the amount paid would have been 
deductible as a business or depreciation 
expense.”51 (Yes, services provided can be a 
working condition fringe even if the employer 
incurs few, if any, out-of-pocket costs.) Another 
quote: “Examples of working condition benefits 
include an employee’s use of a company car for 
business, an employer-provided cell phone 
provided primarily for compensatory business 
purposes, and job-related education provided to 
an employee.”52 The critical question is, as always, 
whether the employee would have been able to 
deduct the cost under section 162 if he had paid it 
himself.
No, an IRS publication isn’t a definitive 
statement of the law, but neither are private letter 
rulings and similar authority from years ago. And 
I know that at least some universities take the 
position that the value of graduate-level tuition 
reductions should not be taxable to employees if 
the requirements for a working condition fringe 
are satisfied — an example being a tuition waiver 
provided to someone to earn an MBA at the 
university’s business school, if the person already 
holds a high administrative position at the 
university.53 If that understanding is wrong, a lot 
of educational institutions have been violating the 
law.54
It’s been suggested that working condition 
fringe treatment should be available for a tuition 
reduction only if the university has established an 
educational assistance program under section 127 
and the program applies only to the extent of 
“amounts paid or expenses incurred” for an 
employee’s educational assistance.55 (The same 
phrase is used in section 132(j)(8).56) And if the 
university itself is providing the education, the 
49
Section 132(j)(8).
50
IRS Publication 15-B, “Employer’s Tax Guide to Fringe Benefits,” at 
22 (2017) (providing that “certain job-related education you provide to 
an employee may qualify as a working condition benefit,” as long as the 
expenditures would meet the requirements for deductibility under reg. 
section 1.162-5 if the employee had paid the expenses him or herself); 
and id. at 9 (educational assistance to employees under a qualifying 
educational assistance program may be excluded under section 127 up 
to $5,250; excess amounts must be treated as wages, “unless the benefits 
are working condition benefits”).
51
Id. at 10.
52
Id. at 21.
53
For example, the question generally asked with tuition waivers for 
employees to attend MBA programs of the university is whether the 
employee is already in a relatively high administrative position. If yes, 
the benefit is a working condition fringe. (MBAs don’t generally qualify 
a person for a new trade or business in that it’s unnecessary to have an 
MBA to be an administrator.) In contrast, for a secretary, say, the 
connection between the MBA and the skills required in the secretary’s 
current trade or business is tenuous.
54
Even though the tax liability would ultimately be the employee’s, 
the university has reporting and withholding obligations that would not 
have been met if a university has been wrong on this issue.
55
Section 127(a)(1).
56
See supra text accompanying note 48.
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university will pay little and incur few expenses 
in educating its own employees.
Should it matter that with a tuition reduction, 
the university doesn’t seem to have any amounts 
paid or expenses incurred? It can’t be the case, can 
it, that expenditures made by a university for an 
employee’s graduate-level education at another 
institution can be excluded from the employee’s 
income under section 127 (up to the cap, of 
course) and, beyond the cap, perhaps further 
excluded if the benefit is a working condition 
fringe (as suggested by section 132(j)(8)),57 but that 
an employee who receives graduate-level 
education at a bargain price at his own university 
wouldn’t get the limited protection of section 127 
and might not even have the rest of the benefit 
characterized as a working condition fringe? 
What sense would that make? Yes, Congress can 
enact nonsensical statutes, but we should try to 
interpret congressional enactments in a sensible 
way, unless it’s just impossible to do so.
In this situation, I have no difficulty 
interpreting section 127 to cover educational 
assistance provided to a university employee at 
the university itself as eligible for the exclusion 
(assuming the other statutory requirements have 
been satisfied) and eligible for working condition 
fringe treatment as well if the connection between 
the education and the employee’s existing trade or 
business is sufficient.58 If that’s so, once again, 
section 117(d) seems to be irrelevant — or at least 
largely so — for TAs. The repeal of that section 
should change none of this.
And maybe I’m making this harder than it 
should be. Remember that, if enacted in its 
original form, the House bill would have repealed 
both section 117(d) and section 127. If that had 
happened, section 132(l) (“This section [132] shall 
not apply to any fringe benefits of a type the tax 
treatment of which is expressly provided for in 
any other section of this chapter”) would no 
longer be problematic, or so it seems. The 
argument that a tuition reduction can’t be a 
working condition fringe because of section 132(l) 
depended on the existence of other provisions in 
the code that deal specifically with tuition 
reductions as compensation. Do away with both 
sections 117(d) and 127, however, and the 
problem goes away with them. As a result, a 
tuition reduction provided by an employer to an 
employee might be a working condition fringe, 
regardless of any prior understanding to the 
contrary. For that matter, if both sections 117(d) 
and 127 had been repealed, the tuition reduction 
might also be a no-additional-cost service 
(although that isn’t clear for graduate students59), 
and it might be nontaxable, in part, as a qualified 
employee discount.60
In short, if the repeal of section 117(d) would 
have had any effect in this situation, it would have 
been only to clarify that the tuition benefit might 
be treated as a fringe benefit potentially 
excludable from an employee’s gross income 
under at least one of the subsections of section 
132.
5. Tuition reduction from family member’s 
employment but also conditioned on 
student’s being a TA.
Finally, let’s suppose the tuition reduction is 
attributable to the grad student’s having a parent 
or spouse employed by the university, but the 
student is also obligated to serve as a TA. (Maybe 
all grad students in a particular department are 
obligated to do TA service.) This situation 
presumably can’t be a qualified scholarship, even 
in part, because the tuition waiver is part of the 
compensation package for the family member.61 
Under section 117(d), the graduate-level tuition 
waiver isn’t tax-free, even in part, unless section 
117(d)(5) would kick in. And it ought to, except 
for any part of the tuition reduction that is 
compensation for the student’s services.62 But take 
away section 117(d), and the full value of the 
benefit would be taxable to the family member 
unless some other theory for exclusion can be 
found.
57
See id.
58
Cf. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1974) 
(concluding that the phrase “paid out” in section 263(a) can 
encompasses the depreciation allowance available for an asset in the 
current year, even though nothing is actually paid in that year).
59
See supra note 46.
60
I know, I know. This particular argument doesn’t work as well if 
Congress had repealed only section 117(d) or only section 127. But I can’t 
work through all the combinations and permutations here.
61
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
62
Section 117(c)(1); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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In this case, section 117(d) may matter a lot. It 
may be only because of the special treatment for 
TAs in section 117(d)(5) that this benefit at the 
graduate level is potentially tax-free, at least in 
part. Even so, however, remember that the 
exclusion for qualified tuition waivers doesn’t 
apply to the extent the TA is being compensated 
for services that were part of the tuition reduction 
package.63
There doesn’t seem to be a possibility of 
treating this tuition reduction as a working 
condition fringe. The TA’s tuition waiver is 
attributable to the family member’s being an 
employee of the university. It’s that person who 
will be taxed on the benefit if no exclusion from 
gross income applies, and the family member’s 
not going to be able to argue plausibly that if he 
had paid Sonny’s tuition, the expenditure would 
be an ordinary and necessary business expense of 
the family member.
Yes, Sonny is treated as an employee for 
purposes of the tuition waiver rules of section 
117(d). That section says to treat as an employee 
for purposes of section 117(d) “any person treated 
as an employee (or whose use is treated as an 
employee use) under the rules of section 132(h).”64 
And those rules treat spouses and dependent 
children as employees, but only for purposes of 
the no-additional-cost service and qualified 
employee discount provisions of section 132, not 
for the working condition fringe rules.65
But as was true with case 4, if both section 
117(d) and section 127 had been repealed, perhaps 
that would have opened up the possibility of the 
benefit being tax-free, at least in part, as a no-
additional-cost service (assuming the education 
provided is in fact an excess-capacity service66) or 
as a qualified employee discount, if the relevant 
requirements of section 132 are satisfied.
B. The Bottom Line in the Five Hypotheticals
In three of the cases considered, most 
graduate-level tuition reductions should not be 
taxable under one theory or another, whether or 
not section 117(d) is in place. For case 3, the 
benefit would probably be taxable (but to the 
family member, not the student) regardless of 
whether section 117(d) is around. A few graduate 
students — those whose tuition reductions are 
attributable to a family member being an 
employee of the university and who are TAs as a 
condition of the tuition reduction — had 
legitimate reasons to be concerned about the 
repeal of section 117(d). That’s case 5, although 
even there a possibility exists for exclusion under 
an alternative theory.67
For most graduate students, therefore, the 
repeal should have made no difference. And 
when a tuition reduction, whether at the graduate 
or undergraduate level, is taxable to someone in 
whole or in part, the consequences shouldn’t be 
nearly as horrific as many contended in the 
discussions about the effects of section 117(d) 
repeal. That’s the subject of Section III.
III. The Measure of Income
Suppose a particular tuition reduction is 
taxable, in whole or in part, to someone. How 
much taxable income is there? The assumption in 
much of the commentary about section 117(d)’s 
possible repeal assumed that the dollar amount of 
any tuition reduction — the reduction in the 
sticker price — would be the measure of income. 
That’s why many graduate TAs went ballistic. 
They assumed that if they were receiving a 100 
percent tuition waiver, and if the sticker price for 
tuition was $50,000, they would have income of 
$50,000 on which they would have to pay taxes. 
Or, if the person taxed on a full tuition waiver is 
the student’s mom, Mom would have a $50,000 
bump of gross income.
That makes no sense to me. The measure of 
income associated with any benefit should be the 
fair market value of the benefit, not the sticker 
price. If a used car dealer transfers a car, at no cost, 
to an employee — pretty clearly there’s 
compensation for services in that case68 — the 
measure of income should be the value of the car, 
63
Id.
64
Section 117(d)(2)(B).
65
Section 132(h)(2) and 132(h) (“For purposes of paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of subsection (a).”).
66
But see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
67
See id.
68
Because of section 102(c), a transfer from an employer to an 
employee can’t be treated as a nontaxable gift, no matter how benevolent 
the employer’s purposes for the transfer were.
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not the figure marked on the windshield. The 
value isn’t $5,000 just because that’s the amount 
the dealer would like to be able to sell the clunker 
for. We all know that the $5,000 is, for most car 
dealers, a starting point for negotiation, not a hard 
and fast price.
And that’s just as true these days for stated 
tuition figures at most colleges and universities in 
this country. Of course, every institution would 
like to be able to get $50,000 (or more) per year 
from each student, but the actual amount paid 
will on average be far less than that. College 
administrators talk about the “discount rate” for 
their tuition — a discount rate of 50 percent means 
that the college receives half the revenue it would 
have had if all students had paid the full sticker 
price. But most colleges couldn’t come close to 
filling their entering classes with students paying 
the stated price — at least not students who can 
read and write. That’s always been true, but it’s 
particularly true now since, in the last few 
decades, stated tuition figures have gone up much 
faster than inflation.
All of that is to say that sticker prices are 
suspect measures of value.69 The used car dealer 
who sells the car marked $5,000 for $1,500 may 
say he has a discount rate of 70 percent, but in fact 
he got full value for the car. If the average student 
at University A is paying only $20,000 to $25,000, 
and maybe even less, when the tuition is 
supposedly $50,000, isn’t that average price a 
better measure of FMV than the sticker price?70
To illustrate the absurdity of using sticker 
price as a measure of income, consider the 
following: Suppose Big College doubles its stated 
tuition figure from $50,000 to $100,000, and 
nothing else changes. Every student pays exactly 
the same amount after the “hike” in tuition as 
before. Surely no one would think that each 
student is getting an additional benefit of $50,000 
and that, if the benefit were taxable to the student 
or his parents, someone should have $50,000 more 
in gross income. Big College might — indeed, it 
probably would — trumpet the increase in its 
financial aid budget (“We guarantee every 
student a scholarship of at least $50,000!”), but 
nothing of substance has happened.
If a typical graduate student at a university is 
paying little or no tuition — and that’s the case for 
graduate students in the arts, humanities, and 
social sciences71 — why in the world would the 
value of a tuition reduction be treated as $50,000 
(or whatever figure constitutes the sticker price)? 
The right number may not be zero — and there is, 
of course, no clearly “right” figure here — but it’s 
hard to see how $50,000 is even arguably right.
Of course, a few people might be paying the 
full sticker price (foreign students being 
supported by their governments, for example), 
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Why, you might ask, would a university with a rational 
administration (they do exist) have an unrealistically high sticker price, 
when a preposterously high figure will inevitably scare away a few high-
quality applicants? Several reasons are generally given: Many foreign 
students do in fact pay (or their governments pay) the full sticker price, 
so it’s necessary for a college to pretend that its real price is that higher 
figure. (Foreign governments are catching on, however.) There is also 
apparently some prestige value associated with having a high sticker 
price. (“We’re as good as Harvard, and of course we charge as much as 
Harvard does.”) Also, with higher and higher tuition figures, university 
administrators can, with a straight face, ask alums for “student support,” 
to cover the “cost” of those scholarships.
And students don’t necessarily suffer from the bloated sticker prices. 
Kids who get a scholarship for $30,000, say — even if almost everyone in 
the student body gets a “scholarship” at that or a higher level — can put 
something like “Recipient, C. Hubert Throckmorton Scholarship, 2016-
2017” on their curricula vitae. The students can also tell Mom and Dad, 
“Look, I got this extraordinary scholarship. Aren’t you proud of me? Oh, 
and given what I’ve saved you, what about that new car?”
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I once mentioned to the CFO of a university that I saw no reason 
why the value of a taxable tuition benefit should be measured by sticker 
price, and his response was that that was the only way he could 
administer a program that provides some taxable educational benefits 
(e.g., tuition waivers for nonadministrative employees in the university’s 
MBA program, when the tuition reduction exceeds the $5,250 figure 
excludable under section 127). I’m not convinced. In many situations 
there’s no way to come up with an income figure that is unquestionably 
right — if, for example, a company official flies on a company jet for 
personal purposes. Rules must be developed to deal with these 
situations, and they have been. Yes, the rules are necessarily somewhat 
arbitrary, but they make the unadministrable administrable. If an 
undergraduate tuition waiver were taxable, I’d say the average price 
paid by an undergraduate student at the particular university would be 
a reasonable estimate of the value provided. Every college in the country 
could easily come up with that information. The same method of 
estimating FMV could be applied to graduate-level tuition reductions as 
well.
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Charge graduate students in the English department $50,000 in 
annual tuition, and the institution will have no graduate program in 
English. If a school is going to have graduate programs in subjects for 
which potential earning power is limited, the institution can’t be 
expected to charge much in the way of tuition, whatever the official 
tuition price is. And there are prestige reasons — membership in the 
Association of American Universities, for example — for a university to 
have a significant number of PhD programs and to generate lots of PhDs. 
See Association of American Universities, “Membership Policy.” Even 
prestigious business schools are cutting the “real” tuition for MBA 
programs. See Gee, supra note 21.
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just as a few buyers of used cars may pay the 
dealer’s initial asking price. But that shouldn’t 
mean that the sticker price is automatically the 
value of the service or property for federal tax 
purposes.
IV. Conclusion
The taxability (or nontaxability) of tuition 
benefits is much more complicated than it should 
be, and I’m sure you can come up with more 
hypothetical situations worth discussion. But my 
conclusion from all of this is that the outrage 
about the effect of a section 117(d) repeal on 
graduate students was overdone.
That’s not to say that a repeal of section 117(d) 
would have been meaningless. It would have 
affected some graduate students, but even more 
important, it would have had a devastating 
impact on the undergraduate tuition waiver 
programs at many colleges and on similar 
programs at private elementary and secondary 
schools. That would have mattered a lot, and it’s 
too bad that the discussion of the repeal of section 
117(d) didn’t focus on those effects. 
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